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A Note On Victoria Laundry
Victor P. Goldberg
For almost a century, the courts, relying on Hadley v Baxendale, restricted
recovery for consequential damages to those damages on which the promisor had tacitly
agreed. That changed abruptly in 1949 with Asquith, LJs opinion in Victoria Laundry v
Newman.1 After that decision, the second limb of Hadley was liberalized; the defendant
would be liable for those losses if it had reason to know of the plaintiff’s possible loss—if
the loss was “on the cards.”2
The law-pre Victoria Laundry was summarized in the 11th edition of Mayne’s Treatise on
Contract Damages (1946):
Is mere knowledge or communication sufficient to impose liability?
Can the fact of such consequences being known or communicated to the
other party be sufficient, unless he was expressly or by implication told
that he would be held answerable for them, and consented to undertake
such a liability? In all probability, if the carrier, in Hadley v. Baxendale,
had been told that any delay in delivering the shaft would make him liable
to pay the whole profits of the mill, he would have required an additional
reward before facing such a responsibility. Every one who breaks a
contract must pay for the natural consequences of the breach, and in most
cases the law defines those consequences. Can the other party, by
acquainting him with further consequences which the law would not have
implied, enlarge his responsibility to the full extent of those consequences,
without a contract to that effect? It is usually in the power of the
defendant to refuse such responsibility, but ought not the onus of making a
contract rather to lie on the party who seeks to extend the liability of
another, than upon him who merely seeks to restrain his own within its
original limits?3
In the 12th edition the rule was “modernized”: “The incorporation of new material since
the last edition in 1946 would … have required some basic reorganization, since the
leading case on contract damages, Hadley v. Baxendale, has now been restated for
modern conditions by the Court of Appeal in Victoria Laundry v. Newman.”4
1

Victoria Laundry (Windsor) LD. v. Newman Industries LD.; Coulson & Co. LD (Third
Parties). 2 KB 528 (1949).
2
At 540. In Koufos, the House of Lords rejected the “on the cards” standard, substituting
other probabilistic language—“more likely than not,” “etc”. the tacit agreement standard
was resurrected in Achilleas, although it has not been enthusiastically embraced. See __.
For an argument in favor of Lord Hoffman’s decision in The Achilleas, See Victor
Goldberg,__
3
Mayne’s Treatise on Damages (ed. W. G. Earengy) 11th ed., 1946, at 28-29.
4
Mayne and McGregor on Damages (ed. Harvey McGregor), 12th ed., vii (1961).
1
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3079729

Asquith LJ noted a discrepancy between the facts in Hadley as stated by the
headnote writer and Baron Alderson’s opinion. The headnote, which asserted that the
defendant’s clerk had been told that the mill was stopped and that the shaft had to be
delivered immediately, was, he said, “definitely misleading.”5 Baron Alderson had not
mentioned anything about a possible mill stoppage, concluding “we find that the only
circumstances here communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants at the time of the
contract was made, were, that the article to be carried was the broken shaft of a mill, and
that the plaintiffs were the millers of the mill.”6
Was the headnote a reporter’s error? Almost certainly not.7 Hadley was discussed
in the 1856 edition (two years after the decision) of Smith’s A Selection of leading cases
on various branches of the law; with notes.8 The co-authors were James Shaw Willes and
Sir Henry Singer Keating (counsel of Baxendale and Hadley respectively). The
communication to the clerk was noted: “Upon the trial before Crompton,J., it appeared
that the plaintiffs having discovered the fracture sent their servant to the office of the
defendants, when he told the clerk that the mill was stopped and the shaft must be sent
immediately.”9 In a subsequent decision, the trial judge, Crompton J, said “ The curious
part of the case is that there was a most distinct notification to the carrier of the
consequences that would follow the non-delivery of the shaft, and yet the Court held that
those consequences could not be taken into consideration.”10
So, the headnote was not misleading,11 but Asquith LJ nevertheless claims to have
been misled. His claim has in turn misled others. Thus, in the 12th edition of Mayne and
MacGregor the statement regarding the headnote was removed: “The text, which in the
last edition was based on this headnote, has therefore been changed accordingly.”12 The
earlier reference was to this statement: “On making the contract, the defendant’s clerk

5

At 537.
At __.
7
“Indeed, the headnote states that the Hadleys expressly told Perrett that the mill had
stopped. In Victoria Laundry, Asquith LJ said that the headnote must be wrong but this
may be doubted.” Venkatesan Niranjin, The Contract Remoteness Rule: Exclusion, Not
Assumption of Responsibility, ch. 10, 187, 198-99, in Defences in Contract (ed. Andrew
Dyson, James Goudkamp, Frederick Wilmot-Smith) Bloomsbury Publishing, Feb 9,
2017.
8
Cite.
9
At 431.
10
Simons v. Patchett (1857) 26 LJQB 195 (during argument at 197). Noted in David
Pugsley, The Facts of Hadley v Baxendale, New Law Journal, April 22, 1976, at 420.
11
Pugsley claims that the clerk was informed on the day preceding formation of the
contract and that information given the day before the contract formation was not
relevant. He concludes therefore that the headnote was misleading. (At 421)
12
p. 114, n.42.
6
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was informed that the mill was stopped, and that the shaft must be sent immediately.”13
Why did the headnote matter? Indeed, why did Asquith LJ even bother to mention
it? After all, the headnote, correct or not, had no precedential value. My claim is that he
raised the headnote issue in order to liberalize Hadley. After noting that the headnote was
misleading, he continued: “If the Court of Exchequer had accepted these facts as
established, the court must, one would suppose, have decided the case the other way
round; must, that is, have held the damage claimed was recoverable under the second
rule.”14
Must it? Baron Alderson could have accepted the fact as true, but irrelevant. Not
all communications would have triggered liability for lost profits—there must be some
threshold below which the communication would be regarded as insignificant. A dozen
years after Hadley, Willes, who was now a judge, confronted that question in British
Columbia Saw Mill Co Ltd v Nettleship.15
And, though he knew from the shippers the use they intended to make of
the articles, it could not be contended that the mere fact of knowledge,
without more, would be a reason for imposing upon him a greater degree
of liability than would otherwise have been cast upon him. To my mind,
that leads to the inevitable conclusion that the mere fact of knowledge
cannot increase the liability. The knowledge must be brought home to the
party sought to be charged, under such circumstances that he must know
that the person he contracts with reasonably believes that he accepts the
contract with the special condition attached to it.16
The Nettleship tacit assumption interpretation was, as noted above,17 the rule
when Victoria Laundry was decided. Even if the headnote were correct, Asquith’s
conclusion that the case would have to be decided the other way around was wrong. But
he then proceeded to act as if he had been right and held that if the defendant knew, or
had reason to know, of the plaintiff’s potential loss, then it would be responsible for that
loss. Even with his lower knowledge threshold, he acknowledged that the relevant date
for the breacher’s knowledge (actual or implied) was at or before the time of the breach
the moment that the contract was executed. He said, “It is important to inquire what
information the defendants possessed at the time the contract was made as to such matters
as the time at which, and the purpose for which, the plaintiffs required the boiler.”18
13

11th edition, page 10.
At 537.
15
British Columbia Saw Mill Co Ltd v Nettleship, (1867-68) L.R. 3 C.P. 499, (1868).
16
At 508-9.
17
See Note 3.
18
At 533. “Where actual knowledge is required to impose liability upon the defendant for
particular losses, he must have that knowledge at the time of entering into the contract:
knowledge after this time, although before breach, is not enough. This is clear from
Asquith LJ’s proposition in Victoria Laundry v. Newman and is obviously correct.”
Mayne & McGregor, 12th ed. at 122-123.
14
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Given the facts, he could not, have awarded lost profits to the plaintiff in Victoria
Laundry. His solution was simple. Alter the facts.
The uncontested facts are simple. Some time in early 1946, Victoria Laundry
agreed to purchase from Newman a secondhand boiler for £ 2150. Because the boiler had
been damaged while being readied for shipment, there was a five-month delay. The
laundry sued for lost profits for the five-month delay under two heads. First, it argued
that it intended to expand the existing business; damages claimed for that delay were £16
per week. Second, it asserted that it could have had highly lucrative contracts for dying
with the Ministry of Supply for which it claimed a loss of £262 per week.
Readers of Asquith’s opinion are familiar with his finding that the plaintiff had
conveyed sufficient information by the date the contract was concluded (April 26) to
recover its lost profits for the first claim, but not for the second.
[O]n April 26, in the concluding letter of the series by which the contract
was made: “We are most anxious that this (that is, the boiler) should be
put into use in the shortest possible “space of time.” Hence, up to and at
the very moment when a concluded contract emerged, the plaintiffs were
pressing on the defendant the need for expedition, and the last letter was a
plain intimation that the boiler was wanted for immediate use.19
Whether the information available on April 26 was sufficient to justify holding
the defendant liable for the lost profits could be contested. Under the prior interpretation
of Hadley, probably not. Newman might have been aware of the potential losses, but had
not accepted legal responsibility for the losses. Most commentators, however, have
accepted Asquith’s conclusion that the information was sufficient. None, as far as I am
aware, have questioned whether April 26 was the relevant date. The trial judge was quite
clear that the contract had been formed two months earlier:
On Feb. 20, the defendants enclosed their official acknowledgment of the
order and asked for payment of 50 per cent. of the purchase price. On
April 26, 1946, is the first intimation that the plaintiffs make of any
particular urgency in the matter. They enclose their cheque for 50 percent
of the purchase price and they continue: “We are most anxious that this be
put into use in the shortest possible space of time and we shall be pleased
if you can arrange to have it dismantled and ready for our transport by
Friday. May 3.” Later the plaintiff company sent another letter to the
effect that the boiler was very urgently required.20
* * *
It is admitted on behalf of the defendants that the defendants knew that the

19
20

At 533-34.
At 807
4

plaintiffs were launderers and dyers, that they were carrying on a business
as such at Windsor, that they required the boiler for use in their business,
and that the contract was made on that basis. The defendants knew
nothing more than those facts. They knew that the plaintiffs required this
boiler for use in some way in their business—how, they were not told. In
what way it was to be installed and what its function was to be, was never
imparted to them. At the very highest, the only information that was ever
given to them was after the actual formation of the contract, when they
were told that it was urgently required.21
Asquith LJ did not claim that the trial court erred in stating that the contract was formed
on February 20. He just ignored that finding and concluded that the contract was not
formed until April 26.
Ironically, Asquith LJ begins his opinion expressing concern about the factual
basis of Hadley, hinting that perhaps Baron Alderson had misrepresented the facts by
ignoring the conversation between Hadley’s agent and Baxendale’s clerk. He concludes
the opinion by misrepresenting the facts in his case (as determined at trial). His
interpretation in the former case allowed him to relax the standard for awarding
consequential damages and his misdating the contract formation allowed him to take
advantage of that relaxed standard in Victoria Laundry.
A puzzle remains. Why, given that Asquith LJ was obviously wrong about the
“misleading headnote,” and why, given that his claim that the defendant must be liable if
it had knowledge was a non sequitur, was his opinion so eagerly embraced? And why, in
the almost seventy years since the decision, has no one called him on his misdating the
date of contract formation? Was the watering down of Hadley “on the cards” and Victoria
Laundry just a convenient vehicle?
The enthusiastic embrace of the decision is in marked contrast to the grudging
acceptance sixty years later of The Achilleas which focused on the intentions of the
parties. In the eighteenth edition of McGregor on Damages, published shortly after the
decision, he wrote: “What Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hope propose is full of difficulty,
uncertainty and impracticality. How are we to tell what subjectively the contracting
parties were thinking about assumption of responsibility?”22 He continued: “What is
clear is that Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hope cannot on their own impose an entirely news
idea upon the law of contract damages. Accordingly, it is only proper to proceed in what
follows in the text on the basis that today the law of remoteness in contract damages
remains as it has stood unchallenged for the century and a half since the first exposition
in Hadley. v. Baxendale.”23 This is a most peculiar sentiment since it was Victoria
21

At 808 (emphasis added)
At 6-171.
23
At 6-174. In the next edition (2014) he was a bit less harsh: “[T]he assumption of
responsibility test appears to be here to stya with us, at least for the time being, because
in the five years thathave passed since “The Achilleas was decided thisnew test has
beenexamined and adhered to not only in a number of first instance cases but also in the
22
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Laundry, not The Achilleas that deviated from the Hadley standard.

Court of Appeal.” (At 8-172) Nonetheless, he continued: “Thus in the five years since
The Achilleas was decided there appear to have been no cases, either at first instance or at
Court of Appeal level, in which damages have been cut down, or cut out, by the
application of the assumption of responsibility test. In light of this, it is to be hoped that
the time of courts will no longer be taken up, indeed wasted, by defendants bringing
forward the new test in unsuitable cases.” (At 8-177)
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